Trusted publishing for SBOMs

As the Eclipse Foundation Security Team, we've spent the past two years helping projects make Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) a regular part of their release process. A central piece of that effort is our SBOM registry: an OWASP Dependency-Track instance where Eclipse Foundation projects can upload their SBOMs and continuously monitor their dependencies for known vulnerabilities. If you missed it, Ioana's blog series, starting with Driving Software Supply Chain Security: Practical Support for Open Source Projects in SBOM Implementation, tells the story of how we've been working hands-on with early adopter projects to generate and upload SBOMs from their CI.

Today, we're announcing trusted publishing for SBOMs: authenticated uploads of SBOMs straight from your project's CI to the SBOM Registry. This work was made possible by funding from Alpha-Omega.

What's new?

Until now, GitHub-based projects uploaded SBOMs indirectly. A workflow stored the SBOM as an artifact, and Otterdog later picked it up and forwarded it to the registry. This worked, but it was limited to GitHub and to one SBOM per workflow only, and it gave the registry no direct proof of where an SBOM came from.

With trusted publishing, your CI job uploads the SBOM itself, using its own workload identity as authentication. There are no long-lived API keys or shared secrets to create, store or rotate. Each upload is checked against the products your project is allowed to publish. And because the upload is now a simple API call, a single workflow can publish SBOMs for as many products as it builds.

Trusted publishing also brings SBOM uploads to GitLab and Jenkins. In addition to GitHub Actions, projects that build and release on Eclipse Foundation-hosted Jenkins instances or GitLab runners can now publish SBOMs to the registry, too.

How does it work?

Behind the scenes, uploads go through the Project Identity Authority (PIA), a new open source service developed by the Eclipse Foundation Security Team. PIA uses OpenID Connect (OIDC) to cryptographically verify where an SBOM comes from, and then relays the SBOM to the associated slot in the registry.

The idea comes from the Python Package Index (PyPI), which introduced Trusted Publishers in 2023 and has since inspired similar efforts across many open source package registries. Our implementation follows the same OIDC-based approach, applied to SBOMs.

How do I get started?

We've kept integration as simple as possible:

  • Request upload permission on HelpDesk naming your Eclipse Foundation project, the products you want to publish SBOMs for, and the GitHub or GitLab repositories, or Jenkins instances that will upload them. We'll register them with PIA and set up the products in the registry.
  • Copy-paste one of the ready-made snippets into your workflow or pipeline script that generates your SBOM and adapt it for your product.

You can find all the details in the How to generate and upload SBOMs section of the Eclipse Foundation Security Handbook.

What did Alpha-Omega funding enable?

With funding from Alpha-Omega, the Eclipse Foundation Security Team was able to develop PIA and integrate it with its SBOM registry. As a result, Eclipse Foundation projects building on GitHub, GitLab, or Jenkins can now publish SBOMs without long-lived secrets, and the registry can verify where each SBOM comes from.

Alpha-Omega protects society by funding and catalyzing sustainable security improvements across open source software.

Questions?

The SBOM registry and PIA are operated by the Eclipse Foundation Security Team. If you have questions, need help, or would like to suggest improvements, don't hesitate to reach out to us at security@eclipse-foundation.org or https://github.com/orgs/eclipse-csi/discussions.

We believe trusted publishing makes SBOMs from Eclipse Foundation projects easier to produce and easier to trust. As always, we appreciate the collaboration of our project communities in keeping the Eclipse ecosystem secure.